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ASSESSING EVIDENCE
Richard D. Friedman*

STATISTICS AND THE EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE FOR FORENSIC

SCIENTISTS. By C.G.G. Aitken. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons,
Ltd. 1995. Pp. xiii, 260. $59.95.
INTERPRETING EVIDENCE: EVALUATING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN
THE COURTROOM. By Bernard Robertson and G.A. Vignaux.

Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 1995. Pp. xxi, 240. $55.
EVIDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS

OF PROBABILISTIC

REASONING.

By

David A. Schum. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1994. Pp.
xviii, 545. $74.95.
Dwyer is accused of burglary. The police have found on his shoes
several fragments of glass that have a mean refractive index close to
- but not identical to - the mean refractive index of fragments of a
broken window at the scene of the burglary.
The police also have found a blood stain near the broken window.
Police investigators have subjected to DNA analysis both this stain
and a sample of blood that they have taken from Dwyer. For each
sample, this analysis attempts to measure the length of fragments at
several identifiable sites, or loci, on the DNA molecule. The measurements for the two samples are very close - though not identical
- for each locus.
How should the significance of this evidence be assessed?
INTRODUCTION

Over the past few decades the law reviews, and more recently
the Internet, have borne extensive discussions of whether, how, and
how much the conventional theory of probability and alternatives
to it are useful in modeling and analyzing problems in the law of
evidence.' The discourse often has been abstract, but, as the hypo* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1973, J.D. 1976, Harvard; D.Phil. 1979,
Oxford. - Ed. I have found communications with Colin Aitken, David Balding, and Peter
Tillers, and especially very extensive communications with David Kaye and Peter Donnelly,
extremely helpful in preparing this review. They have saved me from many errors, and I am
grateful to them for their generosity of time and spirit.
1. See, ag., Ronald J. Allen et al., Probabilityand Proofin State v. Skipper: An Internet
Exchange, 35 JURiMETRiCS J. 277 (1995); Symposium, Decision and Inference in Litigation, 13
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thetical above suggests, it also has important consequences for determining how evidence is presented and assessed in litigation.
David A. Schum's Evidential Foundationsof ProbabilisticReasoning,2 C.G.G. Aitken's Statistics and the Evaluation of Evidence
for ForensicScientists,3 and Bernard Robertson and G.A. Vignaux's
Interpreting Evidence: Evaluating Forensic Science in the
Courtroom4 all have something to tell us about how to use and evaluate evidence. Although the books are addressed to different primary audiences 5 and their authors come from a variety of6
disciplines and from distant points of the English-speaking world,
all three help draw the connection between underlying theory and
presentation in the courtroom. Though Schum uses numerous examples from litigation and discusses the legal literature of
probability and evidence, he focuses primarily not on forensic matters but on the broader question of inference "in our work and in
other parts of our daily lives" (Schum, p. xiii). Accordingly, he examines in depth the structure of inference, emphasizing conventional probability theory and alternatives to it. Aitken and
Robertson and Vignaux, by contrast, essentially assume that the
conventional theory is valid and apposite. They concentrate on the
question of how to apply that theory in assessing and presenting
evidence, especially scientific evidence, in court.
CARDozo L. Rlv. 253 (1991); Symposium, Probabilityand Inference in the Law of Evidence,
66 B.U. L. REv. 377 (1986).
2. David A. Schum is a Professor of Information Technology and Systems Engineering
and a Professor of Law at George Mason University.
3. C.G.G. Aitken is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Mathematics and Statistics at
the University of Edinburgh.
4. When the book was published, Bernard Robertson was a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Business Law at Massey University, New Zealand. He since has become Editor
of the New Zealand Law Journal. G.A. Vignaux is a Professor of Operations Research at the
Institute of Statistics and Operations Research, Victoria University of Wellington, New
Zealand.
5. Schum characterizes his audience as "students, researchers, and practitioners in every
discipline in which there is concern about evidence and its inferential use." Schum, p. xv.
Aitken's book is "intended for forensic scientists as well as statisticians," though he recognizes that some portions might be too difficult for forensic scientists and other portions might
be too elementary for statisticians. Aitken, p. xii. Robertson and Vignaux say that their
book "is designed to be read by both lawyers and forensic scientists so that each will better
understand the other and they will be better equipped to work together to explain the evidence to the court." Robertson & Vignaux, p. xii.
6. Aitken is a Scottish statistician. Schum, an American with a Ph.D. in psychology and
statistics, who defies easy categorization, is in part a systems engineer. Robertson and
Vignaux are both Englishmen now living in New Zealand; Robertson, a former policeman,
and a barrister at the Inner Temple of London, is a legal academic, and Vignaux, a physicist
by training, is a professor of operations research. See supra notes 2-4.
I must admit to a certain bias: I know all the authors personally and like them all. All
have been helpful to me professionally, and two have been gracious hosts to my family and
me. If I thought the books had little value, I would not be able to write a trashing review.
Luckily, I do not have that problem. Indeed, I happily provided a blurb for the dust jacket of
the Robertson and Vignaux book, and I happily would have done the same for the others.
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These three books, very different from one another, are all important works. Anyone wishing to think carefully about the nature
of inference should study Schum's book. The reader is sure to find
her fundamental conceptions - whatever they may be -

seriously

challenged. Evidential Foundationsof ProbabilisticReasoning represents the culmination of many years of Schum's work, and it also
helpfully summarizes much other scholarship from an extraordinarily wide variety of fields. 7 Litigators and academics interested in
evidence, especially scientific evidence, should absorb the arguments that Robertson and Vignaux advocate vigorously and accessibly and that Aitken supports more technically.8 In many contexts,
a lawyer presenting scientific evidence in court should be sure that
his forensic scientist can apply and present the statistical techniques
set out by Aitken - or, if not, that he has a statistical expert who
can.9
I cannot hope in this essay to summarize all the significant aspects of these three books. Rather, I will comment on selected
themes. In Part I, I discuss briefly the usefulness of standard
probability theory for analyzing legal inference. In Part II, I show
why, as all the authors agree, the likelihood ratio is an important
concept within probability theory for assessing the probative value
of evidence. In Part III, I discuss theoretical problems, some highlighted by the authors, concerning the likelihood ratio. I conclude
in Part IV by discussing consequences for the presentation of evidence in litigation.
I. THE

CONVENTIONAL THEORY OF PROBABILITY
AND ITS ALTERNATIVES

I will begin with a primer on some principles of the conventional
theory of probability and its application to problems of inference.
This discussion may strike a median, not necessarily a happy one,
between readers who find it unduly elementary and those who find
it intimidatingly mathematical. Perhaps, though, some readers in
the first group will find the diagrammatic technique interesting,
even though the substance is hardly novel. I hope also that some
readers in the second group will realize, with a little work, that the
mathematics are really quite elementary.
7. 1 do think the book is longer than need be; I suspect a tighter organization would have
been possible.
8. The drama-to-content ratio is higher in the Robertson and Vignaux book than in Aitken's. For some readers, the ideal would be somewhere in the middle.
9. Most of Aitken's analyses are, I assume, persuasive at least to statisticians of a Bayesian inclination, but some are more controversial. See David J. Balding, Book Review, 15
INTL STAT. INST., SHORT BOOK REvIEWs 41 (1995).
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The theory begins with some basic premises. The probability of
any event or proposition is assessed between 0 and 1, with 0 representing impossibility and 1 representing certainty. The probabilities
of mutually exclusive events are additive - that is, if E and H both
cannot be true, P(E or H) = P(E) + P(H). Because E and Not-E

both cannot be true, but one or the other must be true, P(Not-E) =
I - P(E). And P(I1E), the probability of H given that E is true,

may be expressed this way:
(1)10

P'RME) = P(E and H)
P(E)
Figure 1 may help us explore Equation 1.
H

Not E and NotH

Eoan

FIGURE 1

The figure is a box the area of which we may deem to equal 1. A
portion of the box is labeled H and marked with vertical lines. Another portion, which overlaps in part, is labeled E and bears horizontal marks. Thus, the overlapping portion is labeled E and H and
has crossed marks. P(H), the probability that a point picked at random from the entire box will be within H, is simply the area of H;
similarly, P(E) equals the area within E, bearing horizontal marks,
and P(E and H) equals the area of the overlap.
Now suppose we want to assess the probability of a hypothesis
-

that a certain point, randomly selected, falls within H

-

and we

are given a piece of evidence, that the point falls within E. Given
this information, we need not concentrate on the entire box; rather,
we should narrow our focus to the area with horizontal marks, representing the truth of E. Within that area, H is true only within the
smaller area bearing crossed marks. The probability of H, given the
truth of E, is thus equal to the ratio of P(E and H) to P(E) - that
10. See Robertson & Vignaux, pp. 14-15; Schum, pp. 38-43.
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is, the ratio of the probabilities of E and H and of E alone, respectively, both assessed before the truth of E was known.
Because Equation 1 speaks in general terms, the variables E and
H may be reversed. That is,

P(H1E)

= P(H and E)

(2)

P(H)
And because P(E and H) equals P(H and E), Equations 1 and 2
may be combined to yield
P(E and H) = P(E) - P(HIE) = P(H and E) = P(H) • P(EIH),
and so

P(HIE) = P(H)

P(EIH)
P(E)

P(E)

Equation 3 is a form of what is known as Bayes's Theorem (or
Rule), and it deserves close examination. The factfinder's task is to
determine P(HE), the probability of the hypothesis given the evidence. In some cases it will be easier to assess P(EIH), the
probability of the evidence given the hypothesis, which may provide
a practical basis for assessing P(HIE). Bayes's Theorem thus provides a means for transposingthe conditional,using P(EIH) to help
determine P(HIE).
Bayes's Theorem also may be stated in another compact form,
one particularly helpful in discussing the theme of these books.
Substituting Not-H for H in Equation 3, we have
P(Not-HE) = P(Not-H) •P(ENot-H)
(4)
P(E)
Dividing Equation 3 by Equation 4, and simplifying slightly, yields
P(HIE)
P(H)
P(EIH)
P(Not-HME)
P(Not-H) P(EINot-H)
The odds of a proposition X are defined to be P(X)/[1 - P(X)], or
P(X)/P(Not-X). Thus, a probability of .5, or , corresponds to even
odds of 1. The left-hand side of Equation 5 is therefore O(1E),
the odds of H given E, and the first fraction on the right-hand side
is O(H), the odds of H assessed before knowledge of whether E is
true. The second fraction on the right-hand side is the likelihood
ratio of E with respect to H, which I will denote as LH(E). It indicates how much more (or less) likely the evidence E will appear
given the hypothesis H than given the negation of that hypothesis.
Equation 5 now may be rewritten as
O(RlE) = O(H) . LH(E).
(6)
In other words, to determine the posterior odds of H given E,
we can begin with the prior odds of H assessed before we learned
whether E was true, and then multiply by the likelihood ratio. If E
is more likely to be true given H than given Not-H, then proof of E
HeinOnline -- 94 Mich. L. Rev. 1814 1995-1996
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increases the odds of H; by contrast, if E is less likely to be true
given H than given Not-H, then proof of E decreases the odds of H;
and if E is equally likely to be true given H and given Not-H, then
proof of E is irrelevant to H, leaving the odds of H unchanged.
Again, Figure 1 may help demonstrate this relationship. Before
we know whether E is true, the odds of H are the ratio of the area
above the border of H to the area below it, P(H)/P(Not-H). Once
we know that E is true, we must confine our attention to the area to
the right of the diagonal line; within that area, the odds of H are
again the ratio of the area above the border of H to the area below
it, P(E and H)/P(E and Not-H). That is, the proof of E means that
we substitute the smaller area (E and H) for the larger area H in
the numerator of the odds ratio, and the smaller area (E and NotH) for the larger area Not-H in the denominator. Put another way,
adjusting the odds of H in light of E requires us to multiply the
numerator by P(E and H) and divide it by P(H), and to multiply
the denominator by P(E and Not-H)/P(Not-H). By applying Equation 2 to these expressions, we can see that this means more simply
that we multiply the prior odds by P(EiH)/P(EINot-H),which is the
likelihood ratio.
In Figure 1, because the line marking off E runs diagonally
down from left to right, a higher proportion of the H area than of
the Not-H area is within E; that is, P(EIH) is greater than P(EINotH), which means that the likelihood ratio is greater than 1. Thus,
the posterior probability P(HE) is greater than the prior
probability P(H), meaning that the evidence tends to support the
hypothesis. In Figure 2, E is marked off by a vertical line. The like-

NotE and H

Ead
E

Not E and Not H

FIGURE

2

lihood ratio is 1, and the evidence is irrelevant to the hypothesis. In
Figure 3, E is bordered by a diagonal line running down from right
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to left, so the likelihood ratio is less than I and the evidence tends
to disprove the hypothesis.
H

Not Eand Not H

ENotH

FIGuRE 3
All this may seem to have little to do with real evidence and
hypotheses, for most often probability assessment is a highly subjective matter. Most rational observers will agree that the probability
is .5 that a fair coin will land heads up on any given ffip, or that the
probability is .4 that the head of a pin dropped at random over a
given area will land within the top 40% of that area. But reasonable observers may disagree as to the probability that a team from
the American Football Conference will win the next Super Bowl, or
the probability that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone in shooting
President Kennedy. Nevertheless, as Schum shows, probability theory still applies to subjective assessments of probability: the theory
allows an observer to accord any probability assessment to propositions such as these, but continues to impose consistency conditions
on such assessments. Thus, an observer rationally could not assess
as .6 both the probability that a given proposition is true and the
probability that it is false (Schum, pp. 53-54).
I have presented here only the beginning stages - those that
will be helpful for later parts of my discussion - of an approach to
inference based on the application of the conventional theory of
probability to subjectively determined probability assessments. Because of the prominence of Bayes's Theorem in this approach, it is
often labeled Bayesian, and though the label is potentially misleading I will use it here." Schum takes the analysis much further, ex11. The label may be misleading for at least two reasons. First, Bayes's Theorem is an
aspect of probability theory that is not limited to a subjective concept of probabilities; as a
mathematical derivation from premises of the theory, it is not controversial. Second, use of
Bayes's Theorem is only one aspect of the approach to inference based on subjective
probabilities. It is an essential tool for updating probability assessments in some situations,
but in some it is not and in some it is not sufficient. See generally D.H. Kaye, Introduction:
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amining closely some complicated patterns of inference 12 and
revealing the complexities in what superficially might appear to be
a relatively uncomplicated inference. 13 Just as a microscopic view
may reveal that an apparently simple surface is in fact highly complex, the evidence-hypothesis link may be decomposed to a far finer
granularity than in the discussion above. Entire bodies of evidence,
not simply one item, must be considered similtaneously. Also, the
problem may require analysis not just of H and Not-H, but of a
large, even infinite, number of potential hypotheses.
The analysis is, as Schum says, "very rich in its implications,"
but sometimes so rich as to cause "intellectual indigestion" (Schum,
p. 244). As Schum demonstrates, the principal problems are that a
rigorous Bayesian approach often requires assessing many
probabilities, creating enormous computational complexity, and
that as to at least some of these probabilities an observer will have
only a flimsy basis for making the assessment (Schum, pp. 343-44).
The flimsiness problem does not strike me as a serious one: if
we have enough knowledge to understand a proposition, we have
enough knowledge to make a guess - however tentative - as to
how probable it is. To use Schum's terms, I do not believe "total
evidential vacuities exist."' 4 Suppose, for example, you are sitting
in a restaurant when you hear a voice that you do not recognize
yell, "There's been an accident outside!" You know nothing about
the declarant and her relationship to what either did or did not happen outside, apart from what you know in general about the world
and what you can infer from her voice. But you know enough to
make a preliminary assessment of how -likely she would make the
statement if it were true, and how likely she would do so if it were
not - that is, you have enough information to make an assessment,
albeit very tentative, of the likelihood ratio. If you turn to look and
find that she is obviously drunk or obviously joking or, on the other
hand, shaken and bloodied, you rapidly and radically may reassess
the likelihoods in light of this further information.
What is Bayesianism?, inPROBABILITY

AND INFERENCE IN THE LAW OF EVIDENCE:

THE

LiMrrs AND UsES OF BAYESIANISM 1 (Peter Tillers & Eric D. Green eds., 1988), reprinted in

D.H. Kaye, What is Bayesianism? A Guidefor the Perplexed, 28 JURiMETRICS J. 161 (1988).
12. See, e.g., Schum, pp. 382-90, 412-17.
13. See, e.g., Schum, pp. 324-33, 346-50.
14. See Schum, p. 344. One especially perceptive commentator has noted:
It is... difficult to conceive of any question that can be answered by scientific investigation for which a person of more than a few years of age who has not been reared in a
state of total sensory deprivation would have no "empirical data." The data may be
extremely limited, highly peripheral, or grossly faulty, but there will almost always be
some information on which to base a subjective probability.
David Kaye, The Laws of Probabilityand the Law of the Land, 47 U. Ci. L. Rav. 34,44 n.37
(1979).
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Computational complexity poses a significant obstacle to any
theory that assumes that observers can, or should, go through a
complete Bayesian analysis whenever they face an inferential problem. I do not take that position, nor do I know of any commentator
who does. Observers tend to simplify a situation, I have suggested,
as "a way to make the problem intellectually tractable and the demand for information economically feasible."'15 If applied to take
into account all the information we have about a situation, Bayesian analysis requires unrealistically complex calculations, but this
does not suggest a problem with the theory. On the contrary, the
complexity is in the world surrounding us, and the theory would
have limited value if it could not in principle represent that complexity. Probability theory is a flexible template. It can take into
account as much complexity as its user is able to handle. But if
constraints on the user's capacity mean that, at the cost of ignoring
information, she must distill much of the complexity out of the situation - as I have done in the discussion above - the theory is
equally applicable.
Indeed, I do not believe that observers usually need to assess
probabilities consciously, or numerically, to make sound inferences. 16 I contend only that if we are thinking well - and plainly
we do not always do so 17 - we reach, or perhaps move toward, an
equilibrium based at least implicitly on probability assessments that
are roughly consistent with Bayesian principles, applied with the aid
of whatever simplifications we find necessary. In this view, rational
thinking does not require that we actually achieve this Bayesian
equilibrium, only that if at a given time we have inconsistent
probability assessments we make adjustments in the direction of
eliminating the cognitive dissonance.' 8
15. Allen et al., supranote 1, at 295, quoted in United States v. Shonubi, 895 F. Supp. 460,
487 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
16. Figure 1 presents a nonnumerical representation of probabilities by the relative sizes
of areas. Similarly, if we ask an observer how tall another person is the observer may give an
assessment - even a rather precise assessment, whether right or wrong - by holding his
hand a given distance off the ground. We might decide to measure that assessment numerically for our own purposes, but the observer does not necessarily need a numerification for
his purposes - for example, to decide how high he must hide a jar of cookies to put them
beyond reach.
Schum refers to the psychologist S.S. Stevens's "cross-modality matches" procedure, in
which people use one sensory modality to express judgments about another - for example,
adjusting the loudness of a sound to represent the brightness of a light. Schum suggests that
one might extend this approach to expressing intensity of belief in a hypothesis by nonnumerical means. See Schum, p. 224.
17. See generally DANIEL KAHMMAN ET Al-, JUDGMENr UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURIMsTcS AND BiAsEs (1982).

18. Suppose that before knowing whether E was true, an observer assessed O(H) to be
even - that is, 1:1. Then she receives proof that E is correct and assesses O(HIE) as 2:1 and
Ln(E) as 3. There is a dissonance here, because these assessments violate Equation 6. The
observer might respond to this dissonance by adjusting one or more of the assessments; sim-
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Although most of Schum's discussion is orthodox Bayesian, he
also presents three other systems of measuring partial belief. One
of these, the system of so-called Baconian probabilities, which is
associated with L. Jonathan Cohen,19 strikes me as having little
bearing on legal inference. 20
About the only good thing that we can say for the Baconian
approach, at least in the legal context, is that it "makes quite explicit the importance of the completeness of evidential coverage in
any form of inductive reasoning" (Schum, p. 260). Although the
standard of persuasion in a civil case often is expressed in nakedly
probabilistic terms such as "more likely than not," there may be
more to the standard than that. Perhaps a verdict for the plaintiff is
not justified unless the court 2 ' believes not only that the probabilities are on the plaintiff's side but also that it has been presented
with a sufficiently complete picture of the facts in dispute to warrant overcoming inertia and ordering relief. This possibility, it
seems to me, lies at the heart of the well-worn discussion of the so-

called "Blue Bus" hypothetical and related chestnuts. 22 In other
words, while the standard of persuasion includes a probability component that must be conceived of in Bayesian terms, perhaps there
is also a separate completeness component. 23 If so, it may be that
ply because O(H) is labeled priorodds does not mean that she cannot adjust it later when she
focuses on the consequences of that assessment. And it may be that the observer, rather than
eliminating the dissonance immediately, will make incremental adjustments in the right direction. The process might be disrupted before equilibrium is reached.
19. See Schum, pp. 243-61; L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE

(1977).
20. This is ironic given Cohen's emphasis on so-called anomalies and paradoxes in legal
reasoning. See Schum, p. 244. I believe that Cohen misunderstands legal reasoning. See
Richard D. Friedman, A DiagrammaticApproach to Evidence, 66 B.U. L. REV. 571, 575 n.11
(1986); see also Dale A. Nance, A Comment on the Supposed Paradoxes of a Mathematical
Interpretationof the Logic of Trials, 66 B.U. L. REV. 947 (1986). I doubt that many lawyers
will find persuasive Schum's statement, relying only on works of Cohen himself, that Cohen's
ideas "are readily applicable in fields such as law." Schum, p. 261.
21. For present purposes, it is not necessary to distinguish between the court and the jury.
22. See, e.g., James Brook, The Use of StatisticalEvidence of Identification in Civil Litigation: Well-Worn Hypotheticals,Real Cases, and Controversy,29 ST. Louis U. L.J. 293 (1985).
Under one common version of this hypothetical, plaintiff is injured by a negligently driven
bus, but the only evidence she is able to offer to identify the owner of the bus is proof that
80% of the buses driven in the town belong to the Blue Bus Company. The question is
whether this evidence is sufficient to support a verdict for the plaintiff.
23. Incompleteness of evidence with respect to a proposition in itself tends to prevent an
observer from assigning a high probability to the proposition because the observer should
consider the possibility that the missing evidence would, if produced, tend to negate the
proposition. See D.H. Kaye, Do We Need a Calculus of Weight To Understand ProofBeyond
a Reasonable Doubt?, 66 B.U. L. REV. 657 (1986) (relying on this point in attempting to
develop a model of forensic proof that relies exclusively on conventional probability theory
and yet accomplishes the tasks for which an independent concept of weight might be thought
necessary). It may be, however, that a verdict finding a particular proposition to be true will
appear to us more warranted, even given the same probability assigned to the proposition by
the factfinder, if the completeness of the evidence surpasses some threshold. For another
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this completeness component cannot be measured in Bayesian
terms, at least not simply.
Baconian probabilities, though, do not reflect incompleteness in
a way that is useful for legal analysis. They are ordinal, not cardinal;24 they rely on a system of eliminative induction - in which the
grading of probability depends on how many tests, out of how many
possible ones, a given proposition has passed - that has no resemblance to legal factfinding;25 and they do not tolerate the simultaneous partial belief in contradictory propositions (Schum, p. 254).
More promising, I believe, is the system of belief functions developed by Glenn Shafer, 26 which Schum presents lucidly (Schum,
pp. 225-43). This system is, in a sense, a generalization of the Bayesian one,27 and it suffers none of the disabilities of the Baconian
system described above. But, whereas in the Bayesian system P(H)
= 0 means that H is impossible and no other evidence can alter this
probability assessment, in Shafer's system Bel(H), the belief in H,
may be revised upward from 0.28 Similarly, Bel(H) + Bel(Not-H)
does not necessarily equal 1 (Schum, p. 238). If, therefore, the standard of persuasion does incorporate a component of completeness,
this system may provide a useful basis for thinking about whether a
given body of evidence satisfies that requirement. 29 On the other
hand, the mechanics prescribed by Shafer's system for altering beliefs in light of multiple pieces of evidence (Schum, pp. 238-42) - a
problem the Bayesian system handles with ease - strike me as
tentative development of this point, see my comments in Allen et al., supra note 1. at 299,
310.
24. See Schum, p. 251. One indication that the legal system operates on a system of cardinal probabilities is provided by FED. R. EVID. 403, which requires the court to weigh the
probative value of evidence - that is, the extent to which it alters the probability of a material fact - against various considerations, including the danger of unfair prejudice.
25. Thus, Schum's most extensive development of the Baconian system is in a problem of
electronics system analysis, not one of legal fact finding. See Schum, pp. 245-49. Schum's
book, it bears noting, is part of the Wiley Series in Systems Engineering.
26. See GLENN SHAFER,A MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF EVIDENCE (1976).
27. Suppose a set of three mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses, H1, H2 and H3.
In the Bayesian system, P(H) + P(H) + P(H) must equal 1. Shafer's system also requires a
prescribed sum to equal 1, but the requirement is a looser one, applying to the support allocated among subsets of hypotheses. That is, an observer might say that s[H],the support for
H1, is .1, s[H21] = .2, s[H] = .3, and s[H2 H3] = .4. The belief accorded to any subset is then
the sum of the supports for that subset and for any smaller subset that necessarily entails it.
Thus, BeI[H2,H31 = s[H2] + s[H3] + s[Hb H31 = .2 + .3 +.4 = .9, and Bel[H, H3] = .1 + .3 = .4,
but Bel[H2] is simply .2, because the only nonempty subset of [H2] is [H2] itself. The doubt
about a subset is defined to equal the belief of the negation of that subset; because [H2] is the
negation of [H, H3], Dou[H, H,] = .2. And the plausibility of a subset is defined to equal 1
minus any doubt about that subset; thus PI[H,,H,] = .8.
28. See Schum, p. 252. Similarly, Baconian probabilities may be revised upward from 0.
29. Cf.Schum, p. 238 ("Neither posterior nor prior probabilities alone say anything about
the weight of evidence. In Shafer's system there is a relationship between evidential support
and evidential weight.").
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rather unappealing. 30 Schum's discussion of Shafer's system is too
brief to make clear whether this is indeed a flaw so critical that it
nullifies the potential usefulness of the system; thus Schum leaves
me wanting to know more about the Shafer system.
The same goes for the final system Schum discusses, the fuzzy
logic developed by Lotfi Zadeh. The basis of this system is the notion of fuzzily defined sets. To use one of Schum's examples, we
might say that a person age forty-six is neither entirely in nor entirely out of the set of old persons, but is fifty-five percent in the set
(Schum, p. 262).31 This system may well have interesting uses in
legal reasoning, and I suggest below one possibility, but Schum's
explanation is tantalizingly brief and sketchy.
Each of these systems, Schum believes, has some merit; each
"allows us to discern different attributes of evidence and its inferential use" (Schum, p. 510). Perhaps so, but I wish Schum would reserve the term probability for the conventional theory. Other
systems may be useful in grading some other aspects of partial belief, but it seems to me that those aspects are not probability. Indeed, the very fact that those systems operate in a different manner
from the conventional one, grading different attributes, gives them
whatever value they might have. Near the end of his book, Schum
concedes that he has found his "Bayesian lens" more frequently
useful than the others (Schum, p. 510). The reason, he contends too
modestly, is in part his own greater familiarity with the Bayesian
system.32 He does allow, however, that one inherent advantage of
33
the Bayesian system may account in part for his preference.
The Bayesian system is not contrived. Even to the extent it is
only aspirational, it reflects rational treatment of uncertainty based
on intuitively appealing and experientially successful premises.
There is much to be said for the argument by Robertson and
Vignaux that instead of speaking of the Bayesian approach we
might use the term logical, because "the method is essentially a
generalisation of ordinary logic" (Robertson & Vignaux, p. 114).
30. The method bears striking resemblance to an early method for analyzing credibility
that I criticized in Richard D. Friedman, Route Analysis of Credibilityand Hearsay, 96 YALE
L.J. 667, 674-75 (1987).
31. See Schum, p. 262. Rapidly approaching that age myself, I might have guessed that a
lower percentage would be appropriate.
32. Schum is not only modest, but as all who know him can attest, he is an extraordinarily
nice man. I think that, like a deist, he looks for good in everything; such a pleasantly receptive attitude to people and the world might account in part for what he calls his "obstinate
pluralism." See Schum, p. 510.

33. He points to the feature of conditional nonindependence. See Schum, p. 510. It may
be, for example, that given H, proof of E makes Fmore likely, but that given Not-H, proof of

E has no impact on the probability of F.
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LIKELIHOOD RATIO

All three books stress the importance of the likelihood ratio
within the Bayesian system. Though Schum's interests transcend
the legal system, he advocates using the likelihood ratio to measure
the value of evidence and shows carefully how to calculate it in various stylized contexts (Schum, pp. 218-20, 292-446). Aitken declares
that the "main theme" of his book "is that the evaluation of evidence is best achieved through consideration of the likelihood ratio" (Aitken, p. xii). "The likelihood ratio," he says, "may be
thought of as the value of the evidence," (Aitken, p. 49), and much
of his book is devoted to showing how to calculate this ratio with
respect to various types of evidence that a forensic scientist might
offer in court. Robertson and Vignaux address a far less technical
audience and so concentrate far less on calculating likelihood ratios.
To a large extent, their book is a work of advocacy for the proposition that expert witnesses generally ought to testify in terms of the
likelihood ratio. They would prefer that experts testify in terms
such as the following: "This evidence is R times more probable if
the accused left the mark than if someone else did. This evidence
therefore [very] [strongly] supports the proposition that the accused
left the mark. '34
Part I already has discussed the principle that the likelihood ratio, when measured by the prior odds of a hypothesis, yields the
posterior odds of the hypothesis. Thus, Robertson and Vignaux
suggest that, as an alternative to the conclusion of the model testimony above, the witness could testify: "Whatever odds you assess
that the accused was present on the basis of other evidence, my
evidence multiplies those odds by R" (Robertson & Vignaux, p. 65).
I believe that people often use the likelihood ratio implicitly in
ordinary reasoning. Take this illustration: While driving along on
the highway, you wonder whether a nearby car is heading to the
airport. Along with a minority of other cars, this one eventually
takes the exit from the highway that leads most directly to the airport. You might reason implicitly as follows: If they were heading
to the airport, they almost certainly would take this exit. If they
were not heading to the airport, they probably would not take the
exit. P(EIH)is therefore much higher than P(EiNot-H), and so this
evidence makes it significantly more likely that the car indeed is
heading to the airport.
Note that while this evidence makes the airport hypothesis more
likely than it was without the evidence, it does not necessarily make
that hypothesis more likely than not. If, say, the people in the car
34. Robertson & Vignaux, p. 65 (brackets in original); see also Robertson & Vignaux, p.
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all were dressed in bathing suits, you might have assigned very low
prior odds to the proposition that the car was headed to the airport,
and the turn off the highway would not necessarily make that proposition probable - especially if there were a swimming place along
the same road as the one that leads to the airport.
It is important also to note that the logic of this Bayesian argument is not: "Most cars that leave the highway at this point are
heading toward the airport. Therefore, I conclude that this car is
probably heading toward the airport." There are at least three
problems with this kind of stereotyping argument.
First, the premise stated in the first sentence of the stereotyping
argument is an overly demanding one, not necessary for the evidence to have significant probative value: the fact that the car takes
the exit may tend strongly to prove that the car is on the way to the
airport, even though only a minority of the cars that take the exit
are heading toward the airport, because a far higher proportion of
the cars that are heading to the airport than of those that are not
take the exit.
Second, the stereotyping argument equates the probability that
this car is headed toward the airport given that it is taking the exit
with the probability that a car selected at random from all cars taking the exit is headed toward the airport. In doing so, the argument
ignores the prior odds; that is, it ignores all other information we
might have about the particular car, such as bathing suits worn by
its occupants, that might make it appear significantly more or less
likely, as compared with a randomly selected car, to be on its way to
the airport.
Third, the argument does not form part of any useful comparison of stories, because it lacks any causative element. Schum argues elegantly and persuasively that no causative connection is
necessary for evidence to be relevant to a hypothesis (Schum, pp.
140-56). Even so, I think we can assess probabilities more sensibly
when we have a causative relationship in mind. Usually, a car
either does or does not take a given highway exit because of a decision made by the person navigating as to how best to get to the
intended destination. Thus, it makes causal sense to say: "If a car is
heading to the airport, there is a high probability that it will take
this exit (because that is the best way to get to the airport), and if it
is not headed to the airport, there is a low probability that it will
take this exit (because that is not a good way to get to places other
than the airport where people are most likely to want to go from
here)." One would have to believe in purposeless navigation of the
"follow-your-nose" type, or perhaps in anthropomorphized cars
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with unrevealed intentions, 35 to treat as a causal statement, "If the
car takes the exit, it probably will head toward the airport (because
cars taking the exit tend to head that way)."'36
This illustration shows how using the likelihood ratio allows us
to combine new evidence with other information we have that bears
on the hypothesis in question. This approach does not force us to
treat the case as somehow typical of all those in which the evidence
might arise. Moreover, it uses the explanatory force of the evidence given by the causal relationship between the hypothesis, or
its negation, and the evidence.
Now I will vary the airport hypothetical somewhat. Suppose we
are not on a highway but heading north on Central Boulevard. To
get from there to the airport, one must take any of ten cross streets
it does not matter much which one - leading east to Airport
Boulevard. The vast majority of cars on Central that are not
headed to the airport pass the ten streets without turning onto any
one of them. Now suppose a car on Central turns east onto the
third of the cross streets. In this situation, we cannot say that the
probability of this evidence given the airport hypothesis is high that is, that the numerator of the likelihood ratio is nearly 1.
Rather, this likelihood - the probability of turning onto that particular street given the airport as a destination - is presumably
about .1. But this likelihood is presumably still far greater than the
denominator of the likelihood ratio, the probability of the evidence
given the negation of the airport hypothesis - that is, the
probability that the car would take that street given that it was not
headed to the airport. As before, the likelihood ratio is substantially greater than 1, and the evidence significantly favors the hypothesis that the car is headed toward the airport.
The general insight is that evidence may tend to prove a given
hypothesis, even though it is unlikely to arise given that hypothesis,
if it is even less likely to arise given the negation of that hypothesis.
This insight is helpful in thinking about scientific evidence. As suggested by the burglary hypothetical at the beginning of this review,
35. A personal note: When I was very small, my father often said to me, "Let's see where
the car takes us." Almost inevitably, except for one disastrously premature trip to the late,
lamented Ebbets Field, the car took us to the late, lamented Nunley's Carousel. See generally
Pam Belluck, Nostalgia is Power in Fight Over Carousel,N.Y. TrMFvs, Sept. 18,1995, at B6. In
recent years, I have come to believe that my father misled me, in that he directed the car
rather than the other way around.
36. Of course, it would be a fair causal statement to say: "I infer that the car is headed
towards the airport because it is taking this exit, and this, in light of all the other information
I know, suggests the airport as the destination." This, however, is a causal statement about
the inference itself, not about events on the road. Similarly, my three-year-old daughter
sometimes says, "I'm tired, because I yawned." My wife interprets this conclusion as reflecting illogic and ignorance: yawning is not a substantial cause of fatigue. More charitably, I
interpret the statement as shorthand for- "Given the fact that I yawned, and in light of all
other information that I have, I infer that I am tired."
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samples taken from the same pane of glass are likely to have, and to
be measured as having, a variety of different indices of refraction
(Aitken, pp. 174-75; Robertson & Vignaux, p. 115). And, though a
person's DNA is the same virtually throughout his body, the situation is largely similar. Current technology employs remarkably indirect methods to determine DNA profiles, so multiple samples
taken from the same person - and even multiple tests of the same
sample - will yield a variety of slightly different proffles (Aitken,
pp. 216-17, 230-34; Robertson & Vignaux, p. 129). The probability
of an exact match between two measurements, even though the
samples come from a common source, may be very small; consequently, the fact that the measurements of two samples fail to
match exactly does not signify that the samples lack a common
origin.
These statistical disparities create a very complex statistical
problem, but they do not create a fundamental conceptual difficulty
under the likelihood-ratio approach.3 7 If H is the probability that
the two samples have a common origin and E is the evidence of the
measurement of the two samples, then it may be that the likelihood
ratio, LH(E), is very large even though the numerator, P(EIH), is
quite small. We might assess the evidence in this way: "This precise result would be quite unlikely under the hypothesis that the
two samples come from a common origin, 38 but it would be absolutely extraordinary under the hypothesis that the two samples did
not come from a common origin. Therefore, the evidence makes
more likely the hypothesis that the two samples come from a common origin."
Both Aitken and Robertson and Vignaux strongly endorse the
likelihood-ratio approach and argue vigorously against the approach traditionally and most commonly used for DNA and glass
evidence. Under this "two-stage" approach, 39 an observer first
must determine whether the two samples match. A declaration of a
match does not mean that the samples have a common source.
Rather, it means only that the measurements are sufficiently close
to each other to satisfy some prescribed standard. This standard is
generally set by adapting the classical method of statistical infer37. The pioneering exposition withi respect to glass was presented by Dennis Lindley. See
D.V. Lindley, A Problem in ForensicScience, 64 BioMErmliK 207 (1977). Aitken presents an
analysis drawn from Lindley's. Aitken, pp. 179-81, 203.
38. In some cases we could add: "though perhaps it is not substantially more unlikely
than any other precise result under that hypothesis."
39. I believe this term was coined by Ian Evett, a celebrated interpreter of forensic science employed by the British Home Office. For a lucid exposition of the traditional approach and an explanation of how he came to believe it is fundamentally wrong for
application to forensic science, see I.W. Evett, Interpretation: A Personal Odyssey, in TrM
USE OF STA'nSncS IN FOaNSIC SCIENCE 9 (C.G.G. Aitken & D.A. Stoney eds., 1991).
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ence 40 and is essentially arbitrary; if the standard is tight, a match
will not be declared in a substantial percentage of cases in which the
samples in fact come from a common source, and if the standard is
too loose the declaration of a match will lose much of its probative
value. If the two samples are declared to match, the second step is
to determine the significance of the match, usually by determining
the probability that a match would occur if one of the samples were
chosen at random from a given population. In markedly different
styles, Aitken and Robertson and Vignaux ably expose numerous
problems with this approach (Aitken, pp. 92-106, 237-38; Robertson
& Vignaux, pp. 114-20). Among them are the following:
(1) The concept of a match is gratuitous, an unnecessary intrusion between evidence and hypotheses. 41 Put in simplified terms,
the factfinder's task is to assess the relative probability of two hypotheses - that the samples came from a common source, and that
they did not. The evidence is the two profiles revealed by the samples. A factfinder can ask how likely it is that the evidence would
have arisen, given each of the competing hypotheses, without asking whether the evidence satisfies an arbitrarily defined match
standard.
(2) The artificial dichotomy of match-or-no-match produces an
unhelpful bright-line, or "fall off the cliff," effect (Aitken, p. 237;
Robertson & Vignaux, p. 118). Two samples are deemed to match,
notwithstanding small differences between their measurements, as
fully as if they were identical. If the differences surpass a given
threshold, however, the samples are deemed not to match, just as if
they bore no resemblance to one another at all. By contrast, the
likelihood ratio is continuous: all other things being equal, the
greater the difference between the measurements, the smaller the
likelihood ratio.
(3) The match approach may declare no match even though the
evidence, properly viewed, tends to prove that the samples come
from a common source (Aitken, pp. 98-99; Robertson & Vignaux,
p. 119). To prevent false positives, the match approach must declare no match in some cases in which the difference between the
two profiles is unusually large for samples from a common source.
In some of these cases, however, the differential is small enough
that the coincidence would seem extraordinary if the samples did
40. See Aitken, p. 211. A match is declared if the difference between the measurements
is small enough that, if the samples were assumed to come from a common source, the difference would be expected to be as great or greater in a prescribed percentage of cases.
41. See Aitken, p. 106 (quoting with irony an earlier commentary that the likelihood ratio
approach "is of rather limited use to forensic scientists, by-passing as it does the similarity
question altogether"); Robertson & Vignaux, p. 120 ("In fact we do not need the concept of a
match at all.").
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not come from a common source. Thus, the likelihood ratio may be
greater than 1 despite the declaration of no match.
(4) Robertson and Vignaux quite forcefully, and Aitken more
subtly, suggest that evidence presented under the matching approach does not combine readily with other evidence in the case.42
They seem clearly correct that the classical method of statistical inference is designed to test a hypothesis on the basis of data alone,
without relying on subjective probability assessments (Robertson &
Vignaux, pp. 114, 117). For scientific purposes, this method no
doubt has great value. It poses difficulties in the litigation context,
however, because judicial factfinders do not have the luxury of
withholding decision until they have sufficient quantifiable data.
Rather, they must combine the quantifiable evidence with the subjectively determined probability assessments they make on the basis
of the other evidence in the case and the real-world information
they are allowed to consider in order to make an updated subjective
probability assessment.
This concern might have some theoretical force, in the context
of DNA evidence, when a prosecutor presents evidence that two
samples do not match because the disparity between the measurements is so great. Such a conclusion tells the factflinder that the
evidence would be unlikely to arise given the hypothesis that the
samples had a common origin, but it does not combine easily with
other evidence because it does not tell the factfinder how likely the
evidence would arise given an alternative hypothesis. Evidence of
nonmatching is likely to be so powerful, however, that this concern
will not be very substantial. 43
Far more commonly, the critical evidence presented by a prosecutor is that DNA samples do match, and that the frequency of the
profile revealed by the crime scene sample is very rare in a given
population. In such a case, the factfinder is given sufficient information to form a workable likelihood ratio. The probability of the
two samples satisfying the match criteria, given the hypothesis that
they have a common origin, is close to 1, and the probability that
they would satisfy the criteria given that they do not have a common origin and that the crime scene sample was left by some member of the given population, is 11F, where F is the frequency of the
profile in that population. A factfrnder disposed to treat the evidence of a match in a Bayesian way might therefore use a likeli42. See Aitken, p. 237 ("[T]he likelihood ratio ... is easily incorporated with other
evidence.").
43. For example, in an important DNA case discussed both by Aitken (pp. 230-34) and by
Robertson and Vignaux (pp. 168-71), People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1989), the
prosecution had to disprove the hypothesis that blood found on the wristwatch of the defendant was the defendant's own. The prosecution was able to do this without significant difficulty. See Robertson & Vignaux, p. 169.
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hood ratio of approximately F. This approach does not use the data
as fully as does an assessment of the likelihood ratio without the
interposition of the match concept, but it does allow for sensible
combination of the DNA evidence with other evidence in the
case. 44
Ill.

LIMITATIONS ON THE LIKELIHOOD-RATIO APPROACH

The likelihood ratio is often crucial in assessing the probative
value of evidence; however, it is also subject to limitations, three of
which I discuss below.45
A. The Direction of Causality
Both Aitken and Robertson and Vignaux begin by discussing
Locard's principle, that every contact leaves a trace (Aitken, p. 1;
Robertson & Vignaux, p. 3). Most of their subsequent discussion
concerns what is termed trace or transfer evidence.4 6 A great deal
of the evidence that is presented in court fits this form because it
was created by the events in dispute. Thus, the broken glass at the
scene of the burglary presumably was created by the burglary, and
the glass in Dwyer's shoes was deposited there as a result of either
his presence at the burglary or some alternative event that might be
hypothesized. Even testimony might be considered trace evidence;
some event (whether accurately described in the testimony or not)
has occurred and led to the creation of the testimony.
In each of these cases, the chronology, and causation, runs from
the hypothesis being tested or its negation to the creation of the
evidence. Thus, we are able to say sensibly: "If Dwyer were at the
scene, it is likely that the smashing of the window would leave in his
44. The matching approach divides the possible measurements artificially into aggregates
called "bins" and determines the probability, under each of the competing hypotheses, that
the two samples would have measurements falling into the same bin. By contrast, what I
have termed the likelihood ratio approach treats as different each measurement that is possible, given the phenomenon being measured and whatever level of sensitivity the measuring
device has. It therefore might be called the continuous likelihood ratio approach; in a sense,
it uses the smallest possible bins that measuring sensitivity allows, which means that even
samples with a common origin are likely to yield measurements failing into different bins.
45. Robertson and Vignaux also discuss another problem: sometimes there is no
"probability model" to determine the probability of the evidence given an alternative hypothesis. For example, forensic scientists have no basis for quantifying the probability that a
given fingerprint would be created assuming the suspect did not leave it. Based on their
experience, an expert might determine categorically that the print matches that of the suspect, in which case she implicitly treats as infinitesimally small the probability that anyone
else left it. Robertson and Vignaux regard this situation as "unsatisfactory" and say that
"further work is required in order to understand the processes involved in making these
decisions." Robertson & Vignaux, p. 59. "In the meantime," they concede, "the proposal
that all forms of scientific evidence be given in the form of a likelihood ratio is a counsel of
perfection." Robertson & Vignaux, p. 59.
46. See Aitken, p. 1 ("For the most part the evidence to be evaluated will be so.called
transferevidence.").
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shoes glass fragments of the type that actually were found there,
and if he were not at the scene it is far less likely that events would
lead to the deposit of such glass in his shoes. The likelihood ratio of
the evidence is therefore high, and so the glass makes it substantially more likely that Dwyer was at the scene." Not all evidence
fits this mold, however. Sometimes chronology and causation run
from the evidence to the hypothesis, rather than the other way
around. In a murder case, for example, the prosecution may offer
evidence tending to prove that at some point before the killing
something happened that gave the defendant a strong incentive to
kill the eventual victim. Motive might have caused murder; murder
did not cause motive. It does little good in such a case to speak of
the likelihood ratio - the probability of the motive-creating event
given the proposition that the defendant committed the murder divided by the probability of that event given the proposition that the
defendant did not commit the murder.
This is not to say that an observer could not assess the likelihood ratio: given a hypothesis, its negation, and a piece of evidence, an observer can always make an assessment, however
tentative, of a likelihood ratio. But to do so in this case would be a
vain exercise, requiring the conditional to be transposed twice, back
and forth, unnecessarily. We begin with a causation-based sense of
the probability of murder given motive. To determine the likelihood ratio, though, we would have to calculate the probability of
motive given murder and the probability of motive given absence of
murder. And for what purpose? So that we could transpose the
conditional back to where we started and calculate the probability
of murder given motive.
Probably most - though not all - quantifiable evidence is
trace evidence, when causation, and so too our most intuitively accessible probability assessments, runs from hypothesis to evidence. 47 The fact that the relationship sometimes runs the other
way cautions us that the likelihood ratio is not universally useful and that it may not be a good abstract measure of probative value.48
47. Suppose, for example, that paternity of a fetus is at issue and that two men are the
only contenders. The frequency with which each man had intercourse with the woman
around the presumed time of conception is a relevant piece of evidence. The causative relationship is that, all other things being equal, the more frequently a man has intercourse with a
woman at the critical time, the more likely pregnancy is to result - not that if a man and a
woman conceive a child it becomes more probable that they had frequent intercourse at the
critical time.
48. In a given situation, the higher the likelihood ratio of the evidence with respect to a
proposition, the more probative the evidence is with respect to that proposition. This does
not, however, necessarily suggest that the probative value of the evidence should be defined
in terms of the likelihood ratio. That would mean that we would treat the ratio, which we
may express as the ratio of posterior to prior odds, as constituting the measure to be used in
comparing probative value of evidence across situations, and not only in comparing the probative value of different pieces of evidence in the same situation.
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B. Multiple Alternative Hypotheses
Until now, I have discussed matters mainly as if there were only
two available hypotheses - an affirmatively articulated hypothesis
and its negation. Much of the discussion of all three books proceeds on the same basis,49 though of course the authors know that
this is a great simplification. 50 The difficulty is that the negation,
and for that matter the affirmative hypothesis, consists of many,
perhaps infinitely many, subhypotheses, and these do not all necessarily relate the same way to the evidence in question.
Recall the hypothetical car heading off the highway to the road
that leads both to the airport and to a swimming place. If we wish,
we can term H the hypothesis that the car is headed to the airport
and Not-H the alternative hypothesis that the car is headed elsewhere. Obviously, though, a finer-grained analysis is possible. Call
H, the hypothesis that the car is headed to the airport; H 2 the hypothesis that the car is headed to the swimming place along the
same road; H3 the hypothesis that the car is headed to some other
place the most direct path to which requires taking this exit; and H4
the hypothesis that the car is headed to some place the most direct
path to which does not require taking this exit. Now, the evidence
the fact that the car has taken this exit - appears to make H,
more likely as compared to H 4, because the evidence is more likely
to arise given H, than given H4. The evidence does not, however,
appear to make H, substantially more probable as against H 2 or H 3
because the evidence appears about as likely to arise given H, as
given H 2 or H3. So, how much does the evidence alter the relative
probability of H, and Not-HI, which is the same as [H2 or H3 or
H 4 ]?
Schum approves of the use of the likelihood ratio as a measure of probative value in part

because it is insensitive to one aspect of the situation - the prior belief in the proposition at

issue. See Schum, p. 217 ("[A]n item of evidence whose force is graded in terms of the ratio

of posterior to prior odds will have the same measured force in changing a prior belief regardless of the strength of a prior belief." (emphasis omitted)). In my view, whatever the

merits of this insensitivity in other fields, it is a disadvantage in measuring probative value in
litigation. If, taking the other evidence into account, a proffered piece of evidence alters the
odds of a proposition from 1:1,000,000 to 1:250,000, I think we probably should deem it to be
less probative than if it altered the odds from 1:2 to 2:1. 1 have debated the question of how
to measure probative value - a question that is perhaps sterile and certainly arid - at some
length with David Kaye. See Richard D. Friedman, A Close Look at ProbativeValue, 66 B.U.
L REv. 733 (1986); Richard D. Friedman, Postscript. On Quantifying Probative Value, 66
B.U. L REv. 767 (1986); D.H. Kaye, Quantifying Probative Value, 66 B.U. L. REV. 761

(1986).
49. See, eg., Robertson & Vignaux, p. 31 (chapter title: "The Alternative Hypothesis");
p. 42 ("[A]lthough the value of the evidence is decreased if the alternative perpetratoris a
brother, so is the pool of possible suspects." (emphasis added)); p. 48 ("[S]hould the alternative hypothesis assume that the child comes from a stressful and dysfunctional family?" (emphasis added)).

50. See, e.g., Aitken, pp. 110-15 (recognizing the simplification and illustrating a method

for weighing evidence for more than two hypotheses).
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The answer depends in large part on the prior probabilities of
H2,/ 3, and H4. If before receipt of the evidence, 114 appeared to be
by far the most likely of these - the bulk of traffic heads to places
not calling for the airport exit, and we have no basis on which to
regard this car as atypical - then the evidence will have substantial
significance, because it will tend to make 114 much less probable. If,
on the other hand,/112 appeared to be far more probable, because
the occupants of the car were wearing bathing suits and there is no
swimming place nearby except the one by the airport road, then the
evidence will not have much probative value; it is what would be
expected whether the occupants were going swimming or, for reasons presumably best known to themselves, heading to the airport
in their bathing suits.
Now, instead of this somewhat contrived hypothetical, consider
DNA evidence again. H, is the proposition that the defendant is
the source of a blood stain found at the crime. Assuming for simplicity that the stain is indisputably human blood, Not-H is the
proposition that the source was some person, other than the suspect, who was alive at or before the time the stain was created.
Now, obviously Not-H, may be decomposed enormously: it comprises a subhypothesis for every human being alive at the time the
stain was created and then some (assuming that relatively recent
corpses might produce blood for a stain). The prior probabilities
for each person within that large set are plainly not all the same;
people who live near the crime or who knew the victim or who had
some apparent motive to commit the crime are generally more
likely than others to have done it. Moreover, the likelihoods - the
probabilities of the evidence given each of the various hypotheses
- are not the same for each person. Think of a series of concentric
rings. The DNA of identical twins is identical, so that a sample left
by the suspect's identical twin is as likely as one left by the suspect
himself to reveal a given DNA profile; the DNA profiles of family
members tend to resemble each other more than do those of strangers - a tendency that is generally stronger the closer the family
relationship; and DNA profiles tend to resemble each other more
for members of the same ethnic group than for members of different groups.
Because of this genetic consideration, it is analytically incomplete and often unsatisfactory to define a single alternative hypothesis, that someone other than the suspect left the sample found at
the crime scene, and calculate a likelihood ratio on that basis. This
totally aggregated approach creates significant distortion because it
depends implicitly on the assumption that the identity of that other
person does not affect the likelihood that his or her blood would
reveal the profile that the crime scene sample does.
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The most intellectually rigorous approach, a totally disaggregated one, would require computing not one likelihood ratio but
rather several billion, one for each member of the human population. Of course, some of the likelihood ratios would matter very
little, because the prior probability is minuscule that a person who
has never left a small corner of the other side of the world would
have committed this murder so far away from home. The result
would be evidence of this form: The likelihood that a given blood
sample would reveal the same DNA proffile as that of the sample
found at the crime scene is L, times greater on the assumption that
the sample was the suspect's blood than on the assumption that it
was the blood of Person 1, L2 times greater if it were the suspect's
blood than if it were the blood of Person 2... and L5,000,000. 00 times
greater if it were the suspect's blood than if this were the blood of
Person 5,000,000,000.51
Obviously, the evidence cannot be prepared, presented, or digested in this form. We must simplify greatly. The most appropriate method may be to aggregate to an intermediate degree. Under
this approach, an analyst batches alternative hypotheses together,
when this can be done without undue distortion, and determines a
separate likelihood ratio for each significant alternative hypothesis
or batch of alternatives. Suppose that for a large number of hypotheses H1, P(EIH) is virtually identical. Then these hypotheses
may be batched together. Thus, we might say: "The likelihood that
a blood sample would reveal the DNA profile revealed by the sample found at the crime scene is L, times greater on the assumption
that it was the suspect's blood than on the assumption that it was
the blood of an unrelated Caucasian person, La times greater if it
were the suspect's blood than if it were the blood of an unrelated
African-American person, Lh times greater if it were the suspect's
blood than if it were the blood of an unrelated Hispanic person, and
Lb times greater if it were the suspect's blood than if it were the
'52
blood of the suspect's brother.
A few points warrant emphasis. First, we can disregard alternative hypotheses that, even when aggregated, are highly improbable
51. See David J.Balding & Peter Donnelly, Inferring Identity from DNA Profile
Evidence, 92 PRoc. NATL. ACAD. Sci. USA 11,741,11,742-43 (1995) (presenting a theoretical
model in which "there is a distinct term for each possible culprit," so that "[o]ne need not
consider any hypothetical 'random' individual, a concept that has led to considerable
confusion").
52. Robertson and Vignaux write:
Theoretically, there can be an infinite number of different explanations for an event; it
would be impossible to compare the prosecution's hypothesis with all of them. In practice, we can usually identify a small number worth considering.... [A]Ithough it is the
task of the prosecution to prove its case (that is, its assertion or hypothesis) beyond
reasonable doubt we can judge whether it has done so by comparing its case with a small
number of alternatives and, frequently, with just the one offered by the defence ....
Robertson & Vignaux, p. 34.
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because the prior probability is low and the likelihood ratio is presumably high. For a murder in Boston, there is generally no need
to inquire into the DNA characteristics of Navahos, unless there is
some plausible5 3reason to suspect that a Navaho might have committed the crime.
Second, as both Aitken and Robertson and Vignaux stress, the
nature of the alternative hypotheses to be examined generally does
not depend on what we know about the suspect.54 These are, after
all, alternative hypotheses, under each of which someone other than
the suspect is the source of the blood found at the crime scene. Of
course, we may know something about the criminalto a high degree
of probability, such as his race; if so, the hypotheses that would deserve serious consideration all would involve persons sharing that
characteristic. Also, the likelihood of alternative hypotheses may
depend on what we know about the suspect. David Balding and
Peter Donnelly have stressed that because of "positive correlations
in profile possession induced by shared ancestry," the probability is
greater that another member of the suspect's ethnic group will have
a DNA proffle resembling that of the suspect precisely because the
55 The importance of this effect is
suspect's blood has that proffle.
56
an actively disputed matter.
Third, if likelihood ratios are used to compare two hypotheses
that are not collectively exhaustive, we should not speak about the
impact of the evidence on the odds of a given hypothesis, but rather
about its impact on the relative probabilities of the two hypotheses.
The principle is the same, however:5 7 the prior ratio of the
probabilities of the two hypotheses, assessed without the evidence,
multiplied by the likelihood ratio, equals the posterior ratio of the
probabilities of the hypotheses, assessed after the evidence. Thus, if
we define LjE to be the likelihood ratio of evidence E with respect
to hypotheses Hi and Hp it is easy to show that
P(HiIE)
P(IlE) = P(H)
P(I-I)

L,.(7

Indeed, in principle there is no reason why likelihood ratios of more
than two hypotheses may not be expressed. For example, one
53. See Aitken, p. 215 (citing B. Devlin et al., Statistical Evaluation of DNA Fingerprinting: A Critique of the NRC's Report, 259 SCINca 748 (1993)).
54. See Aitken, p. 215; Robertson & Vignaux, p. 44 ("[Ihe view has been put forward
that the value of the scene DNA evidence may be affected by the characteristics of the accused's race. This is never true.").
55. Balding & Donnelly, supra note 51, at 11743.
56. See David J. Balding & Peter Donnelly, Inference in Forensic Identification, 158 J.
ROYAL STAT. Soc., SER. A 21, 49 (1995) (responsive comments of B.S. Weir).

57. Indeed, if the two hypotheses are collectively exhaustive, these two forms amount to
the same thing, because the odds of a hypothesis equal the probability of the proposition
divided by the probability of its negation.
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might say that a likelihood ratio LijkE of 1:(1/2):(1/3) means that E
makes the ratio of the probability of H to that of H two times
greater, and the ratio of the probability of Hi to that of Hk three
times greater, than they were without the evidence.
C. The Effect of Cascading
Schum emphasizes the notion of cascaded inference: it may be
that what we know for sure is not E but E*, which tends to make E,
and so 'in turn H, more likely. For example, we do not know for
sure what DNA proffle a given blood sample has, or even what the
test revealed, but only what the laboratory has reported, and the
lab may be in error. Schum shows that in such a case we need to
know more about the relationship between H and E than just the
likelihood ratio, P(EIH)/P(EINot-H). We also need to know the absolute value of the components, P(EIH) and P(EINot-H). The
smaller they are, all other things being equal, the less valuable evidence E* is (Schum, pp. 306-08). If the components are small, then
E tends to be a rare event, making Not-E more probable; E* therefore tends to be noisy evidence of E, and therefore also of H.
I suspect, though, that the problem is not always very serious. If
we define E as a very rare event, such as two samples sharing a
precise profile, then there is probably a range of near-Es - events
that closely resemble E but are not identical to it - for which
P(near-EIH)is substantially greater than P(near-ENot-H),and for
which P(E*inear-E) is substantially greater than P(E*inowherenear-E). In such a case, the value of E* may depend only very
slightly on the absolute values of P(EIH)and P(EINot-H). Perhaps
the concept of fuzzy probabilities is helpful to analyze this situation,
but I am not sure it is necessary.
In some cases, however, the error rate poses a substantial problem. Suppose a laboratory determines that a crime scene DNA
sample and a suspect sample resemble each other closely, and the
prosecution offers the hypothesis that they have a common origin.
The defense might, of course, offer the alternative hypothesis that
the person who left the crime scene sample happened to have DNA
sufficiently similar to the defendant's that the two samples yielded
similar profiles. Some research suggests, however, that by far the
most important alternative hypothesis is that the laboratory committed error.58 If this is so, I do not think that we can gain much
comfort from Robertson and Vignaux's assertion that "[i]f evidence
58. See Jonathan J. Koehler, Error and Exaggeration in the Presentation of DNA Evidence at Trial, 34 JURiMETrIcs J. 21, 24-26 (1993) (describing proficiency tests and their results); Richard Lempert, Comment: Theory and Practicein DNA Fingerprinting,9 STAT. SCI.
255, 257 (1994) ("[T]he incriminating value of a DNA match can never be greater than the
false positive error probability.... [T]he random match probabilities DNA evidence yields
are smaller than any plausible false positive rates by many orders of magnitude."); cf
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is reported in likelihood-ratio terms then all the possibilities for error should be incorporated into the likelihood ratio" (Robertson &
Vignaux, p. 96). The likelihood ratio must take into account the
possibility that the evidence actually presented - the laboratory
report - results not from the two samples having a common
source, or from a coincidental resemblance in DNA, but from mere
error. And that possibility may be a hard one to quantify precisely.
D. Demands for Data

The likelihood-ratio approach focuses on the precise evidence
that has been presented and asks how likely that evidence would
have arisen under each of the competing hypotheses. One question, for example, may be how likely it would be, if the crime scene
sample were left not by the defendant but by a member of some
given population, that probe D1S7 would indicate fragment lengths
of 9024 and 2166 base pairs.5 9 To provide a satisfactory estimate of
that probability requires a great deal of information. The task is
analogous to determining the frequency of people within a given
population who are between 1.79995 and 1.80005 meters tall. We
can have some confidence, however, that the distribution of heights
is rather smooth, so that data about a larger interval provide a good
basis for estimation. DNA distributions may be spikier; even if it is
appropriate to smooth out the data to some extent, the assumptions
used in accomplishing this task, which
Aitken demonstrates, 60 may
61
affect the results quite dramatically.
IV.

PRESENTATION'

Suppose now that the problems discussed in Part III are not
glaring: the causal relationship runs from hypothesis to evidence,

the alternative hypotheses may be batched together into a tolerably
Kathryn Roeder, DNA Fingerprinting:A Review of the Controversy, 9 STAT. Sci. 222, 244
(1994) (presenting a more favorable view of the laboratory-error statistics).
59. I have taken this example from Aitken, p. 216.
60. See Aitken, pp. 233-34; cf. Balding, supra note 9 (criticizing Aitken's advocacy of
kernel-density estimation because "the underlying density is, due to population genetics, very
spiky"); Roeder, supra note 58, at 241-43 (favoring the practicality of smoothing functions in
using the likelihood ratio approach).
61. In part because of the "detailed information" that a likelihood ratio approach would
require, a committee appointed by the National Research Council (NRC) rejected this approach without full discussion. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN
FORENSIC SCIENCE 62, 85 (1992). A new committee appointed by the NRC to reexamine
certain issues related to DNA evidence, including this one, issued its report shortly before
publication of this essay. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,THm EVOLUTION OF FORENsic DNA EVmENCE (1996). This report explores advantages and disadvantages of such an
approach and, without recommending its adoption, makes some suggestions as to how it
might be implemented. Cf.Lempert, supranote 58, at 258 (arguing, as a former member of
the 1992 committee, that "Bayesian approaches have much to offer in this area" and that the
committee had "no adequate justification" for rejecting them).
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small set without much distortion, lab error is not a significant problem, and a witness can provide satisfactory assessments of the likelihood ratio or of its components. Then it seems that, ideally, the
evidence should be presented in likelihood ratio terms.
Perhaps the expert witness simply should present the likelihood
ratio itself, as Robertson and Vignaux suggest (Robertson &
Vignaux, p. 21). Assuming that only two hypotheses warrant attention, the testimony might take the form: "This evidence is 1700
times more probable if the accused left the mark than if someone
else did." 62 Or perhaps the witness should present the actual components of the ratio, P(EIH) and P(EIH2) for a two-hypothesis
case: "If the accused left the mark, the probability of the evidence
meeting this description would be .17, and if anyone else left the
mark the probability of the evidence meeting the description would
be .0001."
Certainly, in a case like this, the expert should not testify to
P(HIE), because that involves an assessment not only of the likelihood ratio but of the prior probability, P(H), which depends on all
the other evidence in the case. This is a principal theme of
Robertson and Vignaux, who defend the traditional rule barring
witnesses from testifying to the "ultimate issue" (Robertson63&
Vignaux, pp. 60-65). Aitken, less expressly, supports it as well.
There are two basic problems, however. First, not all expert witnesses are reliably capable of the verbal precision necessary to present the likelihoods, or their ratio, correctly. 4 Second, even when
they are, jurors - and many people more sophisticated than the
average juror - often will misunderstand. 65 Probably the most sig62. If more alternative hypotheses seem significant, the witness could make further statements in this form, one for each alternative.
When there are multiple alternative hypotheses, the expert also might offer one likelihood ratio but then disaggregate the denominator. In other words, after stating the overall
likelihood ratio, the expert might say something like, "If the crime scene sample was left by a
Caucasian person other than the accused, it would be twice as likely to yield this DNA profile
as it would be if it were left by an African-American person, and three times as likely as it
would be if it were left by a Native American person." The trouble is that the expert could
not compute the denominator of an overall likelihood ratio on the basis of this information;
she also must assess the prior probabilities - that is, the probabilities assessed without regard to the DNA evidence - of each of the alternative hypotheses. That, as discussed below,
is often an inappropriate role for the expert to play. See infra text accompanying note 63.
63. See Aitken, p. 225. In some cases, though, when the expert is asked on the witness
stand to make the type of judgment she ordinarily makes outside the litigation context, I
believe abrogation of the ultimate-issue rule probably makes sense. See generally FED. R.
EVID. 704 (abrogating the rule, with one later-added exception).
64. See Robertson & Vignaux, p. 92; Balding & Donnelly, supranote 56, at 42 ("Explaining the distinction between the correct and incorrect probability statements at court is excruciatingly difficult (and I speak from experience)."); Koehler, supra note 58, at 28-31.
65. See Bruce C. Smith et al., Jurors' Use of Probabilistic Evidence, 20 LAw & HuM.
BEHAV. 49 (1996) (reporting on experimental studies in which mock jurors tended to underuse evidence, as compared to the Bayesian norm, and in which, in contrast to prior experiments involving more powerful probabilistic evidence, relatively few succumbed to the
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nificant difficulty, in both expert articulation and juror comprehension, is the fallacy of the transposed conditional - confusion of
P(EIH) with P(HIE) and P(EiNot-H) with P(Not-H1E). Applying
the fallacy to both the numerator and denominator of the likelihood ratio transforms the ratio into P(H1E)/P(Not-H1E), the odds
of H given E.
I suspect the problem sometimes is a failure to transpose the
conditional. For example, if a juror is presented with evidence in
the form, "P(EIH)is high and P(EINot-H) is low," an intellectual
laziness might prevent the juror from going through the Bayesian
transformation necessary to determine P(H1E). Part of the problem may be insufficient verbal acuity. It is hard to express the proposition "P(EIH) is much higher than P(EiNot-H)" in any compact
verbal form that does not make it sound much like "P(HE)is much
higher than P(Not-H1E)," and it is hard for a listener, or even a
reader, to make the distinction.
Another part of the problem may be that P(EIH) and P(HIE)
bear a close relationship to one another. Equation 2 shows that
P(EIH) = P(E and H)/P(H), and P(H1E) = P(E and H)/P(E). The
numerator in each fraction is the prior probability of the conjoint
occurrence of E and H. In terms of the diagrams presented earlier,
P(EIH) equals the [E and H] area divided by the H area, while
P(H1E) equals the same [E and H] area divided by the E area. If
P(E) equals P(H), then P(EIH) equals P(HIE). This, it easily can
be shown, happens in one particularly seductive case, when the
prior odds of H are even and
E appears to be as good an indicator
66
of H as Not-E is of Not-H.
Whatever the reason for the difficulty, we are going to have to
deal with it for some time. One would like to think that forensic
scientists can learn to deal with elementary probability theory; lawyers might take longer, and jurors - the general public - longer
still. Perhaps a part of the solution is the proposal advanced by Ian
Evett, and presented sympathetically by both Robertson and
Vignaux and Aitken, of using a standardized set of words to express
likelihood ratios of various strengths - for example, very strong for
a ratio of more than 1000, strong for a ratio of 330 to 1000, and so
forth (Aitken, p. 52; Robertson & Vignaux, pp. 56-57). But, as
Robertson and Vignaux argue, without the numbers we lose a great
"prosecutor's fallacy," a form of the fallacy of the transposed conditional); Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in
ProbabilityJudgment, 90 PsYcHot. REV. 293, 300 (1983) (finding that the transposed-conditional fallacy was common even among graduate students of social sciences, though not as
common as among undergraduates).
66. That is, P(H) = .5 and P(EIH) = P(Not-ENot-H), which by definition equals I P(EINot-H). P(E) = [P(H) - P(EIH)J + [1 - P(H)J •P(EINot-H), so in this case it equals
.5P(EIH) + .5[1 - P(EIH)J = .5.
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deal of information (Robertson & Vignaux, p. 57). Nor is it clear
that we would avoid much confusion by using the numbers alongside the standard verbalizations. The presentation problem is
tenacious.
CONCLUSION

One of the driving themes of the Robertson and Vignaux book
is that when scientific evidence is presented in court, the most difficult problems are likely not to be questions about the underlying
science, or even about proficiency of testing, but about "the interpretation of the evidence" (Robertson & Vignaux, p. 109), "inference and reasoning" (Robertson & Vignaux, p. 173). I am
persuaded by these books that Robertson and Vignaux are probably (there I go again) correct - or to put it in fuzzy terms, correct
to a large degree. They contend further that "logic, probability and
inference provide the language in which [lawyers and scientists]
should communicate with each other" (Robertson & Vignaux, p.
217). I agree, though, that this is more easily said than done. Each
of these books is a significant contribution to the doing, to opening
that channel of communication.
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